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## SPECIAL ANALYSIS

KAMPUCHEA: No Solution in Sight

By [ ] CIA

Two and a half years after Vietnam began its costly occupation of Kampuchea, Hanoi still shows no willingness to accept a negotiated solution. The Vietnamese leadership believes the Association of Southeast Asian Nations will eventually acquiesce in its dominance in Phnom Penh and cease support to the resistance, and probably considers the economic dislocation, international isolation, and heavy dependence on the USSR caused by its occupation to be short-term expenses. In fact, military, political, and economic considerations make it unlikely that the costs to Hanoi will ease any time soon. [ ]

The Vietnamese could be hard pressed to retain control if they withdrew significant numbers of troops, and the puppet People's Republic of Kampuchea would collapse in a short time without Vietnam's backing. There is no sign that the Chinese--the main source of supply for the resistance--intend to scale down their support effort. The Kampuchean economy remains in shambles and dependent on external assistance for its survival. [ ]

The Military Situation

Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchean forces, while unable to gain control of large chunks of territory or major towns, have proved impossible to eradicate. Over the past year or so, they have shown increasing strength. In addition to harassing Vietnamese positions in northern and western Kampuchea, they also have begun limited operations in the east and southeast. [ ]

Some Vietnamese units have suffered substantial losses and high desertions, forcing Hanoi to move in approximately 10,000 additional troops. Vietnamese forces remain in defensive positions, and major offensives are unlikely in the coming rainy season. [ ]

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The resistance, however, is not likely soon to grow strong enough to drive out the Vietnamese. Only Pol Pot leads a viable military force, and his unpopularity among Kampucheans precludes any significant recruiting effort. Moreover, that unpopularity has so far prevented any real cooperation with other resistance groups in Kampuchea.

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#### A United Front

China and the ASEAN countries are pushing the resistance groups to form a united front against the Vietnamese, but prospects for its formation are only fair. Pol Pot and exiled Prince Sihanouk say they are willing to form an alliance, but Son Sann, leader of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front, has posed conditions for joining that could prevent its formation. Son Sann wants to remain a credible independent force available to form a neutralist regime should Vietnam be forced to negotiate a settlement.

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Son Sann's group is more popular than the Democratic Kampuchians in refugee camps, but few see Son Sann as the leader of a strong, effective military movement. Most Kampuchians apparently believe that he would eventually be overpowered in any alliance with the Democratic Kampuchians.

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In any case, such a coalition would only marginally help the military resistance and, with the major participants intensely hostile to each other, would be unlikely to endure. The replacement of most current Democratic Kampuchea officials by people with wider appeal, however, would make the regime more acceptable internationally.

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There are other non-Communist forces, but they are small, disorganized groups with more experience in black market operations than guerrilla warfare.

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#### Prospects

At least in the near term, we do not see resistance of any form developing to the point where the Vietnamese

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would be forced to retreat from their goal of controlling all of Kampuchea. As long as they continue to receive Soviet economic and military assistance, the Vietnamese can continue to bear the cost of military occupation. The situation in Kampuchea itself would be only one of a variety of factors that would produce a Vietnamese change of heart--in the unlikely event that one were to occur. [ ]

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# **Military Forces in Kampuchea**

	Troop Strength	Weapons	Comments
Vietnam	180,000-200,000	Vast array of mostly Soviet-made weapons	Mostly unwilling draftees from the south led by northerners
People's Republic of Kampuchea	20,000	US- and Soviet-made equipment provided by Vietnamese	An ineffective force given little responsibility by the Vietnamese
Democratic Kampuchea	30,000-35,000	Well equipped with small arms supplied by China	Communists with strong leadership
Khmer People's National Liberation Front	3,000	Recently equipped with minor amount of Chinese small arms	Non-Communist with little contact with Vietnamese forces so far; lack guerrilla experience
Moulinaka	Over 500	Few small arms	Non-Communist, loyal to Sihanouk
Khmer Serei	Several thousand	Irregular supply of small arms	Non-Communist, organized into small groups; involved largely in cross-border smuggling operations

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